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Abstract
ROGUE SIGNAL THREAT ON TRUST-BASED COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM
SENSING IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
By David Scott Jackson, Ph.D.
A dissertation proposal submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Ph.D. at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015.
Major Director: Meng Yu, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science
Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) are a next generation network that is expected
to solve the wireless spectrum shortage problem, which is the shrinking of available
wireless spectrum resources needed to facilitate future wireless applications.

The

first CRN standard, the IEEE 802.22, addresses this particular problem by allowing
CRNs to share geographically unused TV spectrum to mitigate the spectrum shortage.
Equipped with reasoning and learning engines, cognitive radios operate autonomously
to locate unused channels to maximize its own bandwidth and Quality-of-Service (QoS).
However, their increased capabilities over traditional radios introduce a new dimension
of security threats.
In an NSF 2009 workshop, the FCC raised the question, What authentication mechanisms are needed to support cooperative cognitive radio networks? Are reputationbased schemes useful supplements to conventional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
authentication protocols? Reputation-based schemes in cognitive radio networks are a
popular technique for performing robust and accurate spectrum sensing without any
inter-communication with licensed networks, but the question remains on how effective
they are at satisfying the FCC security requirements.
xi

Our work demonstrates that trust-based Cooperative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) protocols are vulnerable to rogue signals, which creates the illusion of inside attackers and
raises the concern that such schemes are overly sensitive Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS). The erosion of the sensor reputations in trust-based CSS protocols makes CRNs
vulnerable to future attacks. To counter this new threat, we introduce community
detection and cluster analytics to detect and negate the impact of rogue signals on
sensor reputations.

xii

1

Introduction

Along with advent of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), it is envisioned that billions of
machines will be connected to the Internet, pushing the current communication technologies to their limits in terms of connectivity and performance. Not too long ago,
wireless technologies were generally thought of only encompassing Wi-Fi-enabled laptops, smartphones, and the emerging tablets. Now, the Internet-of-Things, also referred to as Machine-to-Machine (M2M), encompasses much more than that. This
includes everything from cell phones, coffee makers, washing machines, headphones,
lamps, wearable devices, and almost anything else you can think of [19]. Keeping all
this in mind, two problems need to be addressed: 1) “how are we going to overcome
the spectrum shortage problem to enable such interconnectivity at a large scale?” and
2) “how can we manage so many wireless devices effectively?” The Cognitive Radio
technology can help mitigate interference and improve Quality-of-Service (QoS) in such
environments by employing smart techniques for accessing the wireless spectrum in an
opportunistic manner [48].
Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) can sense, detect, and monitor their surrounding radio frequency conditions including the interference and availability of a broad
range of wireless channels, followed by selecting the best one for a given task. This
is called Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) and it is a key characteristic of cognitive
radios that enable Secondary Users (SUs) to operate on geographically unused channels, even when that channel frequency is licensed to Primary Users (PUs), e.g., an
AM/FM radio broadcast station. They have the potential to increase spectrum efficiency that leads to higher bandwidth services and reduce the burdens of centralized
spectrum management by public safety communications officials [18]. The Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA) XG and WNAN (Wireless Network After
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Next) programs are investigating the potential of DSA-capable radios based on inexpensive and adaptable radio architectures that can respond dynamically to the radio’s
surrounding environment [18].

1.1

Spectrum Bandwidth Bottleneck

The growing demand for wireless services shows an inevitable overcrowding of the
spectrum bands, in large part due to the rapid increase of wireless mobile services in
recent years, as depicted in Figure 1 [24]. This example shows the spectrum demand for
mobile broadband services surpassing the available spectrum as early as mid-2013, but
obviously the demand can only go as high as the capacity. This example illustrates the
need for innovative solutions to alter the trajectory of overcrowded spectrum bands.
DSA is the proposed solution to alleviate the overcrowding of bands by allowing licensed
PUs to share unused spectrum with non-licensed SUs in an opportunistic fashion [4, 13].

Figure 1: Spectrum Demand vs Capacity
Conventionally, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had statically assigned spectrum bands to PUs for exclusive use on a long term basis, precluding anyone
else from access [4]. Yet, analysis of the spectrum bands clearly indicate that current
FCC policies have created severely under-utilized spectrum bands, causing a bottle2

neck for new wireless applications. Figure 2 depicts these under-utilized spectrum
bands across the usable radio-frequency spectrum. White space is what the FCC calls
a spectrum band, i.e., a radio frequency wireless channel, that is not used by the PU.
Figure 3, from Google’s spectrum database [27], illustrates that spectrum bandwidth shortage only occurs in densely populated areas, i.e. the major cities, in the
United States, but there remains an abundance of white space all over the country.
White space is indicated by the color green in Figure 3. The FCC is promoting a
spectrum sharing paradigm, where licensed spectrum bands intended for PUs are accessible to SUs on a non-interference basis, as a way to mitigate the spectrum shortage
problem [12].

Figure 2: White space across spectrum Figure 3: White space across US geography
Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) has been proposed as an effective approach for
boosting the detection of primary signals in CR networks, so that SUs know when to
yield to PUs quickly enough to avoid any interference [13, 50, 29]. In centralized CSS,
the SUs submit their sensor reports to the Fusion Center (FC), which is a server for
aggregating and cross-examining the network’s sensor reports to make a robust analysis
of the spectrum availability. The purpose of the FC is to output a global spectrum
decision, based on the sensor reports, to notify SUs if a licensed spectrum band is
available. CSS solves the hidden node problem where a lone SU fails to perceive the
3

primary signal due to shadow fading, and causes interference with nearby PUs. By
working together in CSS, the lone SU can be notified of the existence of the primary
signal from its neighbors [38]. Figure 4 illustrates the CSS model of wireless sensors
gathering information on spectrum availability and reporting it to a fusion center for
a spectrum decision. A global decision (GD) is made after each iteration of the CSS
model, which is either the H0 or H1 . The null hypothesis H0 presumes the primary
signal is absent, and the alternative hypothesis H1 presumes the primary signal is
present.
spectrum f0
Gather reports from all
sensors S

s0

s1

s2

R1

R2

R0
FC computes Global
Spectrum Decision (GD)

...

sN
RN

Fusion Center (FC)

H0 - primary signal absent
H1 - primary signal present

H0

GD

H1

Figure 4: Diagram of Cooperative Spectrum Sensing (CSS)
However, CSS is vulnerable to attacks like the Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
(SSDF) where malicious SUs make false reports on the spectrum availability to mislead
the FC. To counter SSDF, various trust models have been proposed to protect CSS from
malicious SUs. These trust-based CSS protocols build reputation profiles for sensors
and filter out the sensing reports from those with low reputations [12, 30, 5, 7, 25].
Thus, they can single out attackers and mitigate their influence in the shared spectrum
sensing.
Depending on how rogue signals are used, they can achieve Primary User Emulation
(PUE) [12], Sensory Manipulation [15], or Rogue Signal Framing (RSF) attacks [28].
Primary Use Emulation is when a secondary user masquerades as the primary user,
4

forcing all other secondary users to evacuate some channel, and thus invoking a Denialof-Service attack for the secondary network [12]. The Sensory Manipulation attack
occurs when spoofed (rogue) signals distort the environmental perception of a cognitive
radios over time, eventually causing faulty statistics to be stored in its Knowledge
Base (KB) [15]. The KB is the database of information used as input for the cognitive
radio’s learning and reasoning engines. In my work, I introduce the RSF attack as an
exploit on trust-based CSS protocols where rogue signals gave the impression that SUs
were malicious, when in fact the cognitive radio sensors were well-behaved but under
the influence of unauthorized rogue signals. From this point on, I will only refer to
“cognitive radio sensors” as simply “sensors” for convenience.

1.2

Cognitive Radios

Cognitive Radios (CR) are adaptive radios that are designed for improved performance
and flexibility in wireless communications over the traditional radios that are built
upon the more rigid Application-Specific Integrated-Circuit (ASIC) devices. Unlike
their predecessors, cognitive radios can be programmed to have any of the following
qualities: awareness of their operating environment and their own capabilities, autonomous operations to achieve the radio’s goal, and the ability to learn and adapt
from past experiences [55]. In particular, cognitive radios are well known for having
autonomous frequency agility, the ability to switch channels dynamically over a broad
range of radio-frequency spectrum for a more suitable connection, without the need
of user interaction. In contrast, traditional radios broadcast on a single, fixed frequency channel such as the AM/FM radio stations, television networks, cell phones,
and so on. In these examples, both the broadcaster and listener have to be tuned to
the same frequency to receive a particular service such as music from an FM radio
station. An example of a primary network consists of a TV broadcasting station (i.e.
5

the primary transmitter) and the corresponding subscribed viewers (i.e. the primary
receivers) [46, 13].
Cognitive Radios are the devices that enable DSA due to their ability to scan spectrum bands and locate the best available channels on a non-interference basis [15]. The
exact definition of cognitive radios has evolved and branched off into different meanings. The FCC defines cognitive radios as “a radio system whose parameters are based
on information in the environment external to the radio system.” [9] The National
Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) has proposed cognitive radios to
be defined as “a radio or system that senses its operational electromagnetic environment and can dynamically and autonomously adjust its radio operating parameters to
modify system operations, such as maximize throughput, mitigate interference, facilitate interoperability, and access secondary markets.” [9] However, Joseph Mitola was
the first to coin the term “Cognitive Radios” in 1999 and explained it as an intelligent
agent that could search out ways to deliver services and adapt the network protocol
stack to better satisfy the user’s needs [37]. The key aspects associated with Mitola’s
vision of cognitive radios is that they are [9]:
• Aware of surrounding environmental conditions (e.g. the interference for some
channel) and the radio’s internal state such as the operational parameters for
some wireless service;
• Adapting to its environment in real time (e.g. switching to a less noisy channel)
to satisfy the requirements of some wireless service (e.g. message integrity or
Quality-of-Service);
• Reasoning on observations to make the best known decisions, which include
how to adapt to a particular scenario;
• Learning from previous experience to improve its reasoning capabilities; and
6

• Collaborating with other devices to make decisions based on collective observations and knowledge.
These key features require the implementation of artificial intelligence algorithms
as an integral part of the CR. However, the research community remains divided on
how many, and the scope of, these features a radio must possess before it is considered
a CR. The first large scale standard for cognitive radios, the IEEE 802.22, is primarily
focused on frequency agility that addresses the mitigation of interference to PUs [9].
Although cognitive radios are associated with frequency agility and DSA, neither of
these features alone account for the main intelligent attribute that cognitive radios
were initially known for.
Regardless of how cognitive radios are being interpreted, they are being pushed as
the means to solve the spectrum shortage problem by utilizing much of the untapped
spectrum bands as illustrated in Figure 2. The secondary network, consisting of cognitive radios, is given permission to coexist in licensed channels under two preconditions
mandated by the FCC: (1) giving spectrum priority to licensed users and (2) minimizing interference to licensed users. The faster the SUs can detect the primary signal
and vacate the licensed channels, the smaller the interference to the PUs, thus allowing
then the secondary signals to collide less frequently with the primary signal. For this
reason, the secondary network must achieve accurate spectrum sensing to know exactly
when PUs occupy the channel.
Cognitive Radios are composed of several parts: the Software Defined Radio (SDR),
a knowledge base, and the learning and reasoning engine. Traditional radio chips (or
hardware-based) are hard-wired to communicate using one specific protocol. For example, a typical cell phone has several different chips to handle a variety of radio communications: one to contact cell phone towers, another to contact WiFi base stations, a
third to receive GPS signals, and a fourth to communicate with Bluetooth devices. In
7

comparison, software-defined radio hardware works with raw electromagnetic signals,
relying on software to implement specific applications. This makes software-defined
radio devices incredibly versatile, because it has the potential, with the appropriate
software, to perform the same features of all the hardware-based chips currently in our
mobile devices.
Software-defined radio (SDR) is a radio communication technology that is based
on software defined wireless communication protocols instead of hard-wired implementations. In other words, frequency band, air interface protocol and functionality can
be upgraded with software download and update instead of a complete hardware replacement. SDR provides an efficient and secure solution to the problem of building
multi-mode, multi-band and multifunctional wireless communication devices.
An SDR is capable of being re-programmed or reconfigured to operate with different
waveforms and protocols through dynamic loading of new waveforms and protocols.
These waveforms and protocols can contain a number of different parts, including
modulation techniques, security and performance characteristics defined in software as
part of the waveform itself.
Figure 5 shows a diagram of the four main components of a cognitive radio. The
knowledge base is the cognitive radio’s database of environmental statistics (channel noise), communication policies, and any other information that influence its actions [15]. Within the cognitive engine, there are two mechanisms for interacting with
the knowledge base: the reasoning engine and the learning engine. A policy radio only
has a reasoning engine, while a learning radio has both a reasoning and a learning
engine. The reasoning engine is a set of logical inferencing rules, sometimes called a
case-based reasoner. Learning radios typically utilize a variety of classic AI learning
algorithms, including search algorithms, neural networks, and evolutionary algorithms.
For example, a radio can try out different modulation types to see which works op8

Takes Action
Software De ned Radio (SDR)

Feeds Training
Data

Reasoning Engine
Makes Decision

Knowledge Base

Learning Engine

Figure 5: Diagram of a Cognitive Radio
timally in a particular RF environment [15]. Equipped with reasoning and learning
engines, cognitive radios operate autonomously to locate the best unused channels to
maximize its own bandwidth. However, their increased capabilities over traditional
radios introduce a new dimension of security threats [21, 10].

1.3

Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

Cognitive radios utilize the DSA technology that enables autonomous optimization of
radio configurations and the scanning of spectrum bands to locate the best available
channels on a non-interference basis [15, 52, 53]. The cognitive radio network, consisting
of SUs, is given permission to coexist in licensed channels under two preconditions
mandated by the FCC: (1) giving spectrum priority to licensed users and (2) minimizing
interference to licensed users. The faster the SUs can detect the primary signal and
vacate the licensed channels, the smaller the interference. For this reason, the secondary
network must achieve accurate spectrum sensing to know exactly when primary users
occupy the channel [17].
9

The cornerstone of the IEEE 802.22, the first standard for cognitive radio networks,
requires the SUs to yield to the PUs immediately after detecting the primary signal
within a designated region [46]. The 802.22 WRAN standard is aimed at using DSA
technology to allow sharing of geographically unused spectrum allocated for television
broadcast services. So in the 802.22 WRAN implementation, the primary network
would consist of a TV broadcasting station (primary transmitter) and the corresponding subscribed viewers (primary receivers) [46, 13]. Ideally, SUs would occupy unused
TV spectrum in geographical locations where the primary network is absent, but may
coexist as long as the SUs do not interfere with the subscribed viewers’ reception of the
primary signal. However, guaranteeing a minimal level of interference to the primary
network is perhaps the biggest obstacle to the commercialization of DSA technology
and a very difficult problem to solve [13]. In order to have minimal interference, cognitive radios must be able to reliably detect, in real time, the presence or absence of
a primary signal from a given spectrum band. Otherwise, these cognitive radios can
unknowingly transmit signals simultaneously with the primary transmitter, causing
unacceptable levels of interference to nearby PUs [33].
Such unintended interference can arise from the hidden node problem. Figure 6
depicts an SU obscured from the primary transmitter due to obstacles in the environment, in what is called shadow fading. Hence, the SU continues to occupy licensed
spectrum bands simultaneously with nearby PUs. Additionally, an SU may not detect
the primary signal because of multipath fading. This is caused by multipath propagation, the phenomenon that results in a radio signal reaching the receiving antenna in
more than one path. In other words, wireless radio signals bounce off physical obstructions, propagating into new signal copies each time, and culminate into a less audible
and weaker signal at the receiver. Figure 7 depicts an SU unable to detect the primary
signal due to multipath propagation.
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Primary Transmitter

Figure 6: Causes of the hidden node prob-Figure 7: Causes of the hidden node problem from shadow fading
lem from multipath fading
Research results from [4] indicate that shadow fading and multipath fading can be
alleviated by requiring multiple SUs to cooperate with each other to conclude the spectrum availability. This collaboration of sensors, called Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
(CSS) has been proposed as an effective approach for boosting the detection of primary
signals in CR networks [36, 13, 50]. In centralized CSS, the SUs submit their sensor reports to the Fusion Center (FC), which is a server for aggregating and cross-examining
the network’s sensor reports for a more robust analysis of the spectrum availability.
Here, the FC collects the network’s sensor reports and outputs a global decision to
notify SUs if they can access a licensed spectrum band [13]. In decentralized CSS, each
CR operates as a local FC such that each node makes a local decision on spectrum
availability based on its neighbors’ data [13].

1.4

The Push for Cognitive Radio Networks

The FCC promoted the CR technology as the solution to the spectrum shortage problem under the IEEE P802.22 project that started in 2004 [26]. This project hinged
on the dynamic spectrum access of CRNs to tap into geographically unused spectrum.
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The key criteria to this project was the idea of a primary network, the typical licensed
networks like the well-known AM/FM radio stations, and secondary networks that
could harness empty spectrum in the absence of the primary networks. More specifically, they did not want to add any extra burden to the primary network, nor did the
FCC want a 3rd party facilitator, but instead a self-policing secondary network [9].
The start of this project mobilized research institutions to investigate the potential for
many years to come.
The FCC relies almost entirely on certification to produce trust, their process to
guarantee that new devices will follow access rules through product inspection [51].
When regulators require trust, the technical response has been policy engines that are
essentially easily-certifiable decision trees that guarantee a device will make certain
decisions based on cognitive radio’s sensory input. There are many problems with this
approach, because the policy engine cannot guarantee that all contexts will produce
appropriate answers. Consider all the challenges of signal detection in all environments
due to shadow fading, Rayleigh fading, and interference in general. No policy engine
can guarantee these nodes will be able to realize their predicament and not transmit.
Hence, as of January 2011, the FCC finalized the rules for the cognitive use of TV white
space in the US. Ultimately, the rules from FCC’s “Second Memorandum Opinion and
Order” [16] state that cognitive radios, operated by SUs, must download the spectrum
occupancy table via the internet to discover unused channels.

“While we are eliminating the sensing requirement for TVBDs (TV Bands Devices),
we are encouraging continued development of this capability because we believe it holds
promise to further improvements in spectrum efficiency in the TV spectrum in the future and will be a vital tool for providing opportunistic access to other spectrum bands.”
- FCC [16]
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That means there are no longer any spectrum sensing requirements, including Cooperative Spectrum Sensing (CSS), when detecting available channels within the TV
broadcast bands. However, FCC encourages continued development of spectrum sensing as stated below. Again, FCC stresses continued research in spectrum sensing
applications in the following post:

“Second, I hope that equipment developers and device manufacturers will continue
their work on sensing technologies and take advantage of the flexible approach outlined
in the item. I appreciate the well-articulated concern that requiring both sensing and
database consultation could have a chilling effect on the initial deployment of white
space devices. However, I am hopeful that the widespread commercial deployment of
sensing technologies will play a critical role in increasing access to spectrum not only in
the TV white spaces but in other spectrum that from time-to-time or in certain locations
lies fallow. Sensing technologies have shown great promise in other contexts, including
Department of Defense research, and I look forward to finding ways to encourage and
advance their deployment for commercial purposes.” - FCC [16]

Note that the final rules encourage further research in cognitive radio sensing techniques, since this may be useful for other spectrum bands and different applications.
Interestingly, the final rules discard the idea of cognitive radios: is it cognitive to
download from a database a list of free channels? Although the IEEE 802.22 protocol
no longer uses spectrum sensing, there are other applications that could leverage the
technology. In the FCC article [18], the FCC talks about current government-funded
projects aimed at new cognitive radio applications:
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“As noted in our last topic, the DARPA XG and WNAN Programs are investigating
much more dynamic frequency selective radios based on agile radio architectures that
can respond dynamically to the radio’s surrounding environment... Perhaps the key to
the success and the future development of cognitive radio lies in the ability of developers
and practitioners, that is, the first responder community, to establish the policy rule
set by which the radios will operate...” - FCC [18]

The silver lining to the disregard of the dynamic spectrum sensing requirement, is
that the FCC and DARPA still continue to promote this technology because the technology holds promise. The DARPA XG and WNAN (Wireless Network After Next)
programs are investigating the potential of DSA-capable radios based on inexpensive
and adaptable radio architectures that can respond dynamically to the radio’s surrounding environment [18]. For example, the CR technology is believed to be able to
reduce the burdens of centralized spectrum management by public safety communications officials, once the technology becomes viable [18].
The potential of the cognitive radios is being studied in many different paradigms
and applications of networks, and how it can overcome many resource intensive problems. This includes cognitive mesh networks where the opportunistic spectrum access
(or DSA) can alleviate the scarcity of wireless bandwidth needed to maintain the
Quality-of-Service requirements [47]. Another scenario where the CR technology is
being contemplated is in natural disaster areas like earthquakes and hurricanes that
obliterate the devastated area’s network infrastructure. The DSA from cognitive radios
can temporarily provide an abundance of wireless bandwidth needed to facilitate the
high traffic from emergency responders [44]. Other areas where cognitive radio applications are being researched include public safety networks [22], battlefield networks [43],
and leased networks [23].
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1.5

Contributions

To counteract this new threat, we propose a new defense scheme, named the RSF
Clustering Defense (RCD) module, that looks for dense clusters of sensors and examines
the proximity and similarity of their reports. Based on the RCD findings, it makes
a heuristic decision on whether or not the network was affected by an RSF attack
via rogue signals. Thus, the RCD module can distinguish sensors under the RSF
intrusion and mitigate the trust damage. In effect, our defense prevents trust models
from becoming an overly sensitive IDS by minimizing the false alarms caused by rogue
signals, but still relies on a trust model to stop SSDF attacks. We focus on mitigating
the impact of the RSF attack on trust-based CSS protocols by introducing a dynamic
and flexible rogue signal detection solution. The following is a list of contributions:
• Introduced the Rogue Signal Framing Intrusion, an attack on the trust model of
CSS protocols
• Developed a solution, the RSF Clustering Defense (RCD), that protects sensor
reputations from manipulation in trust models
• Ran simulations that demonstrated the impact of the RSF intrusion and the
RCD solution
• Devised a community-detection clustering algorithm to distinguish between malicious/malfunctioning sensors and well-behaved sensors that are misguided by
rogue signals
• Ran extensive simulations that demonstrated an upward of 6% to 40% improvement, depending on the scenario parameters, in detecting rogue signals
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 reviews common CRN
attacks and trust-based CSS protocols. Then, we present the attack model and system
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in Chapter 3, and show the details and analysis of the RSF intrusion in Chapter 4. We
propose the RCD defense and evaluate it in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 investigates different
clustering techniques and demonstrates the effectiveness of our parameter-free solution
against different scenarios. Finally, the paper is concluded in Chapter 7.

16

2

Related Works

My work is mostly related to the following attacks and defenses in CRNs.

2.1

PUE and SSDF Attacks

Although CRNs are vulnerable to a variety of attacks [15], two attacks received much
attention. One is the Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack [11, 8, 39], where an
attacker masquerades as the primary transmitter from the vantage point of its neighbors. The other attack is the Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) [13, 12, 45],
in which compromised users falsify the local spectrum sensor reports to obscure the
existence or create the illusion of a primary signal at the FC [35]. Both of these attacks
attempt to deceive the FC on the availability of spectrum resources, causing networks
to behave in unintended ways. In contrast, the RSF intrusion disrupts the trust between the FC and sensors, which makes the spectrum sensing less stable. Figure 8
illustrates the SSDF attack, where the grinning devil represents a malicious SU, the
envelopes represent the sensor reports, and because of the falsified sensor report, the
FC makes an incorrect judgement on the spectrum availability.

Figure 8: Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
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2.2

Trust-based CSS Protocols

To defeat SSDF attacks, various trust models have been proposed to protect CSS
from malicious SUs. These trust-based CSS protocols build reputation profiles for
sensors and filter out the sensing reports from those with low reputations [12, 30, 5,
7, 25]. Thus, they can single out attackers and mitigate their influence in the shared
spectrum sensing. Figure 9 exemplifies the structure of the typical trust-based CSS
protocol, including the trust model that filters out falsified sensor reports through cross
examining the observations.

Figure 9: Trust-based CSS protocol protects CRN against SSDF attack
Chen et al. [12] presented a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) that scales the
contribution of sensors by their reputation in order to mitigate the impact of SSDF
attacks. Their model incorporates sampling votes on the detection or absence of the
primary signal, and weighing each vote according to the sensor’s reputation. For every
vote identical to the global decision, the sensor’s reputation is incremented, such that
their vote carries more weight in future decisions made at the fusion center. Kaligineedi
et al. [30] presented a pre-filtering average combination scheme. The scheme’s filters are
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responsible for (1) filtering extreme outlier sensor reports and (2) ignoring sensors that
have continuously deviated from the majority over a length of time. Arshad et al. [5]
presented a beta reputation system model for hard-decision CSS protocols. Similar
to [12], the sensors are rewarded for agreeing with the global spectrum decision, but
otherwise penalized. In [7, 3, 54], the authors developed a trust-based CSS protocol
that penalized sensors if their reports deviated too far from the expected Received
Signal Strength (RSS) values determined by common RSS models. The similarity
of these approaches are to build reputation profiles for spectrum sensors in order to
filter out sensing reports from untrustworthy sensors. However, my work shows that
the reputations can be manipulated and, as a consequence, well-behaved sensors are
framed and removed from the shared spectrum sensing.

2.3

Received-Signal-Strength Anomaly Detection

Apart from reputation profiles, there are solutions that rely on RSS models and statistical methods to validate the authenticity of sensor reports. Min et al. [34] presented an
algorithm that analyzes sensor clusters and their RSS correlation, based on distance
and approximated shadow fading, to pinpoint malicious sensors and reduce/remove
their input from the fusion center. A big difference in my work and theirs is that
they rely (and assume) apriori knowledge of the environment’s shadow fading to accurately predict the expected RSS value for a cluster of sensors. Secondly, they have
no reputation model to go along with anomaly detection, so their solution discards
the sensor reports in single intervals instead of penalizing the sensors for an extended
duration. In [35, 32], the authors developed solutions using RSS estimation models and
Support Vector Machines (SVMs), a machine learning technique, to classify sensors as
either anomaly or normal. Unlike the various aforementioned solutions, I developed
my own defense based on cluster analysis and community detection to safeguard sensor
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reputations from manipulation, instead of only focusing on the integrity of the CCS.
What makes my solution unique is that the proposed defense protects the integrity
of trust models, i.e. sensor reputations, from rogue signal manipulation. Previous
literature used trust models to stop malicious SUs (and their sensors) from deceiving
the CSS, but did not consider the trust models themselves to be the target of attacks.
Trust models were considered reliable solutions against SSDF attacks and malfunctioning sensors, but to my knowledge, none of the papers discussed how to manipulate and
disrupt trust models. I realized the vulnerability of trust models due to their coarse
threshold of penalizing inaccurate sensor reports, i.e. a sensor is deemed untrustworthy
if it does not behave in a predetermined way. However, if an attacker knows how the
sensors should behave, then they can leverage rogue signals to disrupt typical sensor
behavior and thus destroy their reputations. To protect sensor reputations, I explored
techniques from social network analytics, such as cluster analysis and community detection, as opposed to relying on RSS models or shadow fading estimations to predict
the correct sensor report.
Figure 10 illustrates how rogue signals can masquerade as an SSDF attack, i.e.,
mimicking a malicious sensor when in fact the sensors are well-behaved and functioning
properly. The root of the problem lies in the trust-based CSS protocol’s inability to
distinguish the source of a bad sensor report, which could be due to a malicious SU, a
malfunctioning sensor, interference due to shadow fading, or a purposely injected rogue
signal. Protocols that punish with a broad stroke any sensor who reports differently
gives attackers an exploit to turn the reputation schemes against their own users.

2.4

Motivation for Distinguishing Between RSF and SSDF

In an NSF 2009 workshop, the FCC had raised the question, “What authentication mechanisms are needed to support cooperative cognitive radio networks? Are
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Figure 10: Trust-based CSS protocol exploited by RSF attack
reputation-based schemes useful supplements to conventional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authentication protocols?” [47] Reputation-based schemes in CSS (a.k.a.
trust-based CSS protocols) are a popular technique for performing robust and accurate
spectrum sensing without any inter-communication with the primary network, but the
question remains on how effective they are at satisfying the FCC security requirements.
My work takes a closer look at the robustness of trust-based CSS protocols.
In secondary networks, it is very hard to conclude the root cause of bad sensor
reports, which can vary from (1) malfunctioning sensors, (2) the hidden node problem,
(3) SSDF attacks (i.e. malicious secondary users), and (4) rogue signals. Yet, the trustbased CSS protocols treat all inaccurate sensors the same way, in that they penalize
secondary users and diminish sensor reputation all the same. An important question
I wanted to investigate was, “Should the trust-based CSS protocols treat all inaccurate
sensor reports the same way, regardless of the root cause? Or does it cause more harm
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than good to the system in certain scenarios.”
To test my hypothesis, I simulated multiple directional rogue signals against targeted clusters in a cognitive radio network. The simulation illustrated the impact
of rogue signals negatively affecting sensor reputations which, in severe cases, shows
roughly 40% of sensors penalized and eventually ignored in the shared spectrum sensing
process. In other words, nearly half of the sensors were removed without any fault of
their own, e.g. the sensors were not malfunctioning nor behaving maliciously but were
still penalized. That means an outsider has the potential to trick the reputation scheme
in order to filter out nearly half of the sensors, thus diminishing the performance of the
network’s shared spectrum sensing. Trust-based CSS protocols have proven effective
against malicious secondary users who report falsified sensing reports, but they did
not consider the impact of rogue signals. Hence, based on the outcome of my simulations, I consider trust models as overly sensitive Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
for penalizing sensors without taking into account the root cause of abnormal sensor
reports.
Not being able to determine the origin of inaccurate sensor reports opens the possibility for attackers to use RSF as a stepping stone attack against trust-based CSS
protocols. Chen et. al [12] models attacks against CSS protocols as a Byzantine Fault
Tolerance system, in that the CSS protocol can continue functioning as intended as
long as there are not too many Byzantine failures, which in this case are generally
hidden, malicious, or malfunctioning sensors. In contrast, my work demonstrates that
the RSF attack lowers the Byzantine Fault Tolerance of trust-based CSS protocols, due
to having less secondary users participate in the shared spectrum sensing, thus making
the system less robust against Byzantine Failures.
Clancy et al. [15] warns of a similar threat of rogue signals, but in a different context.
They claim that rogue signals can cause faulty statistics, collected from the physical
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layer (e.g. RSS, channel availability, etc.), and stored in the knowledge base. The
cognitive radio’s behavior is determined by the learning and reasoning engines which,
in turn, depends on the knowledge base of spectrum observations across many channels
overtime. Hence, the cognitive radio may not behave as intended, or in fact cause harm,
when the knowledge base contains faulty statistics that inhibits good decision making.
Both my work and theirs [15] express the importance of being able to defend against
rogue signals. The difference, however, is my work protects the sensor reputations in
trust-based CSS protocols whereas their idea is related towards protecting the integrity
of the knowledge base.
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3

Attack Model

In this chapter, I define the RSS model and the method of attack for the RSF which
employs directional antennas. The attacker manipulates sensor reputations by transmitting rogue signals to targeted sensors, thus causing conflicting sensor reports in the
network. To ensure that reports do conflict, directional antennas are used to avoid
targeting the entire network.

3.1

System Model

Figure 11 illustrates the system model of trust-based CSS protocols and the different
targets of PUE and RSF intrusions. In it, f0 represents some wireless spectrum frequency, Si a set of sensors, and Ri the corresponding set of sensor reports. The system
model is a stack of dependent layers, starting with the spectrum channel, the network
of sensors, the trust model, and finally the FC. The accuracy of the CSS is dependent
on the FC receiving reliable input from the above layers. For example, the spectrum
spectrum f0
Gather reports from all
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s0

s1

s2

R1

R2

R0

...

RN

Remove untrustworthy
sensors Sr from S

Trust Model (Filter)
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H0
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Figure 11: Trust-based CSS Protocol
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channel must be clear enough for communication, the majority of sensors must not be
malicious or malfunctioning, and the trust model must filter the malicious sensors to
protect the FC from bad input.
Without loss of generality, I use a system as shown in Figure 12 to discuss the
proposed security issues. Within the network area, the spectrum sensors are randomly
distributed and the attacking antennas are positioned in the middle. The FC collects
the sensor reports and cross-examines the local spectrum observations to make a global
decision on channel vacancy. Spectrum sensing occurs in scheduled time intervals when
all communications from the secondary network stops, called quiet periods, in order to
listen for the primary signal [13].
n

D

Primary Transmitter
Sensor
Fusion Center
Attacker
n

0,0

Figure 12: RSF Attack Model
Computer generated simulations were used to demonstrate my hypothesis, i.e., the
vulnerabilities inherent in trust-based CSS protocols. The reason for using simulations
was to create the same environment assumed in the first ever cognitive radio standard,
the IEEE 802.22 WRAN standard [46], which has a very large contour region and
network size in terms of CR users. Currently, there does not exist a test bed of cognitive
radios that compares in size and scope of the IEEE 802.22 environment, nor was there
any datasets that suited the needs of this paper from well-known data repositories like
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CRAWDAD [1].

3.2

Propagation Model

Energy detection. I decided to use energy detection because it is the most widely used
spectrum sensing technique for cognitive radio networks [34, 50, 42]. Secondly, energy
detection is used on three trust-based CSS protocols that I borrow for my simulations,
from papers [12, 30, 5].
When an attacking antenna emits signals, the RSS in decibels per milliwatt (dBm)
for any given sensor si can be modelled according to [41]:

Ri =




N (µω , σω ),

H0

(1)



10 log10 (Pray (dij )) + Ls [xi , yi ], H1
This model gives two possible RSS values. When the antenna is not transmitting
(i.e., case H0 ), the RSS is simply the environmental noise, for which µω is the noise
power mean and σω is the noise variance. On the other hand, when the antenna is
emitting signals (i.e., case H1 ), the RSS is determined by the attenuation of signal
propagation from the attacker to the sensor plus shadow fading on position [xi , yi ].
The function 10 log10 (·) is used to convert milliwatts to dBm.
In the H1 case, I use the Rayleigh fading model in milliwatts (mW), expressed
as: [31, 49]

q
Pray (dij ) = PFS (dij ) r12 + r22

(2)

coupled with the Free Space propagation model [31]:

PFS (dij ) =

Pt Gt Gr λ2
(4πdij )2
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(3)

where dij is the distance between si and the jth attacking antenna, λ denotes the
wavelength (meters), Pt is the emission power, Gt and Gr are the antenna gains of the
transmitter and receiver (respectively), and r1 , r2 ∼ N (0, 1) are used to simulate the
stochastic nature of wireless channels [31]. Equation 3 is illustrated in Figure 14, with
operational parameters of 10 dBm (Pt = 10) and 45◦ beamwidth (Gt = 32).
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Figure 13: Propagation Model

Figure 14: 3d Power Flux Density

The RSS value Ri is measured in decibels per milliwatt (dBm). However, the
Rayleigh fading model (from Equation 2) is in milliwatts (mW), so I apply the unit
conversion dBm = 10 log10 (mW ) in Equation 2 under hypothesis H1 . To incorporate
shadow fading into Equation 1, I used Ls [xi , yi ] ∼ N (0, σL ) where σL is the shadow
fading variance [20], as illustrated in Figure 15. In the propagation model, I assume
that the channel bandwidth is much larger than the coherent bandwidth, so the effect
of a multi-path fading is negligible, and thus removed from Equation 1 [46].

3.3

Directional Antenna Model

Rogue signals are generated by directional antennas to manipulate the sensor reputations. The antenna radiates in a smaller area surface, compressing the radiated energy,
and thus raising the signal’s strength. Hence, Gt in Equation 2 is substituted by the
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Figure 15: Auto-correlated Shadow Fading Map
directional gain according to [2]:

2



G(θ, φ) = (4πr )

4
2
πr sin(θ)sin(φ)


(4)

In Equation 4, θ and φ are the vertical and horizontal angles of the beam width,
respectively. For simplification, I assume θ = φ. Furthermore, I assume that the
rogue signals only affect the sensors inside the beams of the directional antennas. To
determine which sensors are attacked, I need to calculate the angle between the attacked
sensor and the directional antenna, as illustrated in Fig. 16. The angle between position
p~i of the ith sensor and position p~j of the j th antenna is:

θij = arccos

p~i · p~j
k~
pi kkp~j k


(5)

where p~i , p~j ∈ R2 . The ith sensor is affected by the rogue signal if θij falls between
the lower and upper beam angles θl , θu of the j th transmitter such that θl ≤ θij ≤ θu .
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Figure 16: Capturing sensors in the radiation pattern of rogue signals.

4

Rogue Signal Framing Intrusion

In this chapter, I introduce the Rogue Signal Framing (RSF) intrusion and demonstrate
its impact on the network’s total trust through simulations.
In the CSS paradigm, the physical layer (i.e. the sensor) provides local signal detection. The FC collects the sensor reports and validates the signal authenticity through
cross-examination of the RSS spatial diversity from the network. However, verifying
the source of RF waves at the physical layer is incredibly challenging, especially for energy detectors that can only observe the RSS. Since the energy detectors only measure
raw RF energy, there is no cryptographic means to identify the source [15, 38].
According to the first CRN standard, the IEEE 802.22, the secondary network
must be self-reliant in minimizing interference to the primary network which requires
accurate spectrum analysis [11]. In the case of SSDF attacks, trust models have been
effective at removing malicious sensors from the shared spectrum sensing [12, 30, 5, 7].
However, these trust models cannot distinguish between malicious sensors and accurate
sensors misled by rogue signals (as opposed to the legitimate primary signal). In
other words, sensors are labeled untrustworthy when they have a consistent history of
abnormal sensor reports, regardless of the cause.
Rogue signals can raise a sensor’s RSS well above what is expected, especially in
the absence of the primary signal. So a prolonged rogue signal on a group of sensors
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can cause a sharp contrast in local spectrum observation from the others, thus appearing malicious and no different than SSDF. Consequently, the security protocol brands
these sensors as untrustworthy and removes them from the shared spectrum analysis
for as long as the stigma remains. As such, launching rogue signals on specific regions
of the network over many quiet periods leads to the exploitation of the trust model via
the RSF attack. In the context of CSS, I define the term Rogue Signal Framing attack
as follows,

Definition: Rogue Signal Framing attack breaks the trust between the fusion center and a group of sensors via rogue signals to create the illusion of malicious sensors

To launch this attack, I exploit directional antennas to launch rogue signals on a
regional group of sensors, and thereby causing them to report abnormally high RSS
compared to the rest of the unaffected network. When sensors start reporting differently, the FC interprets the situation as an SSDF attack, when in fact the sensors
reported honestly. In essence, I can use rogue signals to emulate false SSDF attacks to
harm innocent sensors, and mitigate their cooperation in shared spectrum sensing.

4.1

Motivation for Directional Antennas

In a CRN with energy detectors, the RSF attacker must limit the rogue antenna’s
coverage in order to avoid a successful PUE. Directional antennas make it possible
to isolate its radiation pattern to a targeted group of sensors (with the rest of the
network unaffected), thus convincing the FC that the defecting sensors are malicious.
On the other hand, isotropic antennas emit RF waves in all directions and maximize
the antenna’s coverage. This leaves a massive RF finger print in a network of energy
detectors. Chen et. al. [11] proposed an RSS-based location verification scheme to
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detect and pinpoint PUE attacks enforced by a dense network of sensors. However,
this scheme was not tested or tailored for pinpointing directional antennas.
Directional antennas are difficult to detect, and even harder to pinpoint, because
of their ability to emit rogue signals with narrow and asymmetrical radiation patterns.
Any changes made to the beam-direction and beamwidth of a directional antenna
can drastically change the network’s RSS spatial diversity. These observations are
supported by work from Bauer et. al. [6]. In their experiments, they demonstrated
that directional antennas can disrupt localization algorithms on IEEE 802.11 WLANs
that resulted in very high errors.

4.2

Trust Damage

The main goal of the RSF attack is to compromise the trust between the FC and
network sensors. To quantify the trust damage (as a percentage), I use the following
equation to measure the network’s trust score TΣ [q] on quiet period q with:




1
X

ti [q]
TΣ [q] =  P

ti [0] s ∈S
si ∈S

(6)

i

where ti [q] is the trust score of sensor si ∈ S. In each trust-based CSS protocol, the
trust score is represented differently. In order to compare the trust damage between
each protocol, I normalized the trust score ti such that ti [q] ∈ [0, 1] in the equation.
In each quite period, a group of sensors may lose their trust due to the RSF intrusion, so TΣ [q] changes from one quiet period to the next. As the time passes on,
sensors exposed to RSF suffer an increasing amount of trust damage, so I expect TΣ [q]
will decrease as the number of quiet periods q increases.
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Table 1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
Ns
Nr
γθ
f
µω
σω
dθ
σL
Nx × Ny
Cmin
Zθ

4.3

Value
400
4
-92 dBm
615 MHz
95.2 dBm
0.3 dB
150 m
4.5 dB
2, 000 m ×2, 000 m
5
0.3

Description
Number of sensors
Number of rogue antennas
Sensor sensitivity
Channel frequency
Noise power mean
Noise power std
distance threshold
Shadow fading variance
Grid dimensions
Minimum cluster size
Cluster threshold

Attack Evaluation

To test my proposed framing intrusion, I borrow three different trust-based CSS protocols. The first protocol FA , by Chen et al. [12], utilizes the sequential probability ratio
test (SPRT) and weights the probability by the sensor’s reputation to mitigate the
impact of SSDF attacks. The second protocol FB , by Kaligineedi et al. [30], utilizes a
pre-filtering average combination scheme. These filters are responsible for (1) filtering
extreme outlier sensor reports and (2) ignoring sensors with high trust penalties. The
third protocol FC , by Arshad et al. [5], utilizes a beta reputation system model for
hard-decision CSS protocols. Like FA , the sensors are rewarded for agreeing with the
global spectrum decision, but otherwise penalized. These protocols were denoted with
the letter F to represent the fusion algorithm with these protocols, which is the the
systematic process of collecting sensor reports and “fusing” them into a pot to make
statistical observations that leads to a conclusion.
These CSS protocols were chosen because they each had different methods of evaluating trust (fusion algorithm), yet shared similar properties in which to compare them
by, such as they are all centralized CSS protocols and each sensor is assigned a trust
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Table 2: Comparison of Selected Fusion Algorithms (CSS Protocols)
Protocol
FA
FB
FC

Fusion Algorithm Sampling
Sequential Probability
true
Ratio Test (SPRT)
Average Combining,
false
Outlier Filter
Beta distribution
false

RSS Threshold
static
dynamic
static

(or reputation) score. Table 2 shows some of the main differences between the three
chosen protocols. Because protocols FA , FB , and FC are centralized, I can look at
the big picture that allows me to compute the network’s overall statistics and apply
community detection via clustering techniques. Some of the differences include: a)
looking at samples vs. population of sensor reports and b) assigning an RSS threshold
statically vs. dynamically for determining the FC’s decision of H0 and H1 .
I make the following assumptions on the simulation’s environment according to an
IEEE 802.22 WRAN environment that encompasses UHF/VHF TV bands between 54
MHz and 862 MHz [46]. In my simulation, 400 sensors are located inside a 2000 × 2000
grid. I assume the incumbent broadcasting station operates at the UHF frequency of
615 MHz. Like Figure 12, there are four rogue directional antennas facing the cardinal
directions and positioned on the map’s center. Protocols FA , FB , and FC are tested
on RSF attack scenarios, labeled as RSF-15, RSF-30, and RSF-45 which corresponds
to the scenario’s antenna beamwidths of 15◦ , 30◦ , and 45◦ , respectively.
Figure 17 shows the network’s total trust TΣ [q] over 100 quiet periods for each
scenario. Depending on the protocol and different evaluation environment, the RSF
intrusion removed nearly 15% to 45% of the network’s total trust which correlates to
the percentage of sensors removed from the shared spectrum sensing. As expected,
TΣ [q] initially decreases and plateaus over time. It plateaus when the misled sensors
eventually have no more trust to lose.
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Figure 17: Displays the network’s total trust (from Eq. 6) over 100 quiet periods for
protocols FA , FB , and FC . Like Figure 12, there are four rogue directional antennas
facing the cardinal directions and positioned on the map’s center. The beamwidth of
each rogue antenna is 15◦ , 30◦ , and 45◦ for scenarios RSF-15, RSF-30, and RSF-45,
respectively.
In Figure 17, the change in the network’s total trust ∆TΣ [q] per quiet period is
different for protocols FA , FB , and FC , because a sensor’s trust score is adjusted differently for each protocol. Hence, these protocols behave differently against rogue signals,
but the overall trend is a net loss of total trust TΣ [q] as the quiet period q increases
over time. The protocol differences can be summarized briefly as follows:
• Protocol FA : sensor trust is increased when the local spectrum decision agrees
with the FC’s global spectrum decision and penalized otherwise; only applies to
a random sample of sensors with varying sizes
• Protocol FB : the rate and scope of trust damage depends on the environment’s
RSS variance; the protocol’s penalty threshold scales with the environment’s
noise variance
• Protocol FC : sensor trust is increased when the local spectrum decision agrees
with the FC’s global spectrum decision and penalized otherwise; applies to all
sensors
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From Figure 17, I observe that both protocols FA and FC start to plateau, because
the ti of misled sensors eventually falls to 0, causing the ∆TΣ [q] to become stagnant over
time. However, protocol FB differs in that it does not have local spectrum decisions
to compare to FC’s global spectrum decisions. Instead, it determines if a sensor is
malicious when the reported RSS value exceeds a dynamic threshold that correlates
with network’s RSS variance. As the attack coverage increases from RSF-15 to RSF-45,
so does the RSS variance and the FB ’s behavior towards the RSF attack.

4.4

Byzantine Fault Tolerance

The CSS paradigm can be modeled in the context of the Byzantine Fault Tolerance
problem. The authors in [12] describe a Byzantine failure as either a malfunctioning
sensor or an SSDF attack. In both cases, the sensors perform unreliable local spectrum
sensing that could ultimately mislead the FC to a wrong spectrum decision in the form
of a misdetection or false alarm. These decisions are based on the null hypothesis H0 ,
where the primary signal is presumed absent, and the alternative hypothesis H1 , where
the primary signal is presumed present, from equation 1.
A misdetection is when the FC decides H0 when in fact the primary signal is present,
and may result in unacceptable interference to the primary users. Conversely, a false
alarm is when the FC decides H1 when the primary signal is absent, and causes a
Denial-of-Service of spectrum resources for secondary users. The hypothesis tests are
represented in Table 3.
Table 3: Hypothesis Test
H0 is accepted
H0 is rejected

Primary Signal Absent (H0 ) Primary Signal Present (H1 )
Correct Decision
Misdetection
False Alarm
Correct Decision

The RSF’s ability to damage sensor reputations does not directly influence the FC’s
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spectrum decision like in SSDF or PUE attacks. Instead, the RSF lowers the system’s
fault tolerance, because the FC has to rely on less sensors to infer the presence of the
primary signal. Hence, the RSF weakens the reliability of shared spectrum sensing for
trust-based CSS protocols in the aftermath of the intrusion.
The global spectrum decision is typically determined by a consensus on spectrum
observations. However, the more sensors that report inaccurate or are ignored will
diminish the chance of the fusion center outputting the correct decision. Figure 18
illustrates this notion of the Byzantine Fault Tolerance in the CSS context, where
the number of accurate sensors in service increases its robustness, and vice versa.
Theoretically, a CSS system with hard-decision requires 51% or more sensors to swing
the fusion center’s decision in favor of the majority, but the percentage shrinks when
sensors are filtered for bad reputation. For example, when 60 sensors out of 100 are
considered trustworthy, only 31 is needed to determine the fusion center’s decision.

Figure 18: Byzantine Fault Tolerance applied to CSS context
I demonstrated the RSF attack via rogue signals could destroy sensor reputations
earlier in this section. The next step is to measure the Byzantine Fault Tolerance of the
trust-based CSS protocols after the deterioration of the sensor reputations. To evaluate
the weakening of the Byzantine Fault Tolerance, I compare how many sensors need to
be attacked, denoted as SA , before the fusion center (FC) outputs an incorrect decision
after four scenarios; NONE, RSF-15, RSF-30, and RSF-45. The scenario NONE is the
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’no prior attack’ scenario, and is used as the Byzantine Fault Tolerance in which to
compare the RSF attack damages to the CSS. The RSF scenarios were conducted over
100 quiet periods. The number of attacked sensors, SA , was incremented until the FC
outputted a wrong decision. This adequately portrays either a PUE or SSDF attack,
since both attacks require misleading a certain amount of sensors before becoming
successful.
Table 4: Shows the number of attacked sensors SA and safe sensors S − SA
SA
NONE
0
RSF-15 40
RSF-30 99
RSF-45 169

S − SA
400
360
301
231

Table 4 shows the number of attacked sensors SA and, essentially, the remaining
sensors left to participate in the shared spectrum sensing, S − SA . Conceptually, SA
represents the number of sensors removed from contributing to the shared spectrum
sensing, so the trust-based CSS protocols must rely on a smaller set of sensors (S −SA ).
250

Avg. Byzantine Threshold
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Figure 19: The Byzantine Fault Tolerance threshold of protocols FA , FB , and FC
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Figure 19 displays the number of attacked sensors needed (for a given protocol) to
mislead the FC’s spectrum occupancy decision, denoted on the y-axis title as ”Byzantine Threshold”. It shows that as SA increases, the Byzantine Fault Tolerance threshold
decreases, giving way to a more vulnerable CRN. Notably, the sensor reputations are
exploited to weaken the system’s overall robustness when rogue signals are injected.
The problem is these trust-based CSS protocols cannot differentiate between SSDF
attacks, which it was intended for, and RSF attacks. As pointed out in my Type-1 vs.
Type-2 framing subsection, roughly 51% or more trusted sensors are needed to sway
the FC’s decision. Hence, for RSF-15 attack scenarios which destroys the reputations
of 10% (i.e., 40) sensors, I can expect at least half of the remaining trustworthy sensors
(360) to cause the FC to make an incorrect decision. This half of about 180 that sways
the FC’s decision represents the Byzantine Fault Tolerance threshold. The RSF-45
attack scenarios account for roughly 42.5% (169) sensors reputations destroyed, which
requires roughly 116 attacked sensors to mislead the FC into making a wrong decision.
In the experiments, however, the Byzantine Fault Tolerance is not perfectly aligned
with each protocol since they have their differences in how they compute trust score,
and whether they filter OR scale a sensor’s influence on the FC by its sensor reputation. Protocol FB has an unusual outcome in scenario RSF-30 that does not follow the
same pattern as the other scenarios and protocols. This is because the RSS threshold
of protocol FB (that determines if a sensor made a good or bad choice) is dynamic, in
that it fluctuates based on the average RSS readings.

4.5

Two Types of Framing

To create an illusion of malicious sensors, there needs to be a separate group of wellbehaved sensors to delineate good-from-bad sensor reports. Unfortunately, classifying
sensors as either honest or malicious is speculative, as the FCC regulations remove any
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obligations of the primary network to communicate with the secondary network [15].
Hence, the secondary network is left to assume channel occupancy (i.e. the global
spectrum decision) with hypotheses like H0 and H1 . Therefore, if all sensor reputations
are in good standing, such that all sensors equally participate in the shared spectrum
sensing, then the global spectrum decision is typically determined by the majority of
sensors.
This is especially true for hard-decision combining, which is when the FC makes a
global spectrum decision based on a collection of local spectrum decisions, reported by
sensors individually, in the form H0 and H1 . Protocols FA and FC use hard-decision
combining, with each decision weighted by sensor reputations. Alternatively, the FC
can perform soft-decision combining to determine the global spectrum decision based
on a collection of non-discrete sensor observations, e.g. energy detectors that report
the RSS values instead of a local spectrum decision.
Soft-decision combining benefits from using more descriptive data, but also becomes
more vulnerable to outliers in sensor reports, e.g. extremely high or low RSS values.
Generally, CSS protocols are designed to reduce the impact of outliers or remove them
entirely, but this still leaves the majority of sensor reports as a strong determinant of
the global spectrum decision, just like in hard-decision combining. That is, a majority
of sensors will typically decide the global decision, even if that majority is comprised
of malicious sensors or affected by a wide-reaching rogue signal, as seen in the case of a
PUE attack. In such a case, the FC concludes that the disagreeing minority of sensors,
even if well-behaved, are presumed inaccurate.
Hence, I define two outcomes of rogue signals with regard to damaging sensor
reputations, called Type-1 Framing and Type-2 Framing:
• Type-1 Framing: the sensors misled by the rogue signal are in the minority
and lose trust, while the rest of the network gains trust
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Figure 20: The two outcomes of rogue signals in trust-based CSS protocols. The plus
sign indicates an increase of reputation for some sensor, while the minus sign indicates
a decrease.
• Type-2 Framing: the sensors misled by the rogue signal are in the majority
and gain trust, while the rest of the network loses trust
For consistency, I will describe sensors affected by a rogue signal as misled sensors,
and sensors that are not as unaffected sensors, like in Table 5.
Table 5: Attack Outcomes on Trust Models
RSF
Misled Sensors
Lose Trust
Unaffected Sensors Gain Trust

PUE
Gain Trust
Lose Trust

Prior to this section, Type-1 Framing has been the designated type of trust manipulation to describe the RSF attack. Type-2 Framing, which is also a result of rogue
signals, is worthy of discussion for simultaneously accomplishing a PUE attack and
harming sensor reputations. Both attacks are manifested through rogue signals but
can only be distinguished by the attack’s outcome, such as misleading the trust model
(via RSF attack) or the FC (via PUE attack). To my knowledge, the fact that a
PUE attack may inadvertently affect sensor reputations has not yet been considered
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in previous literature. I believe Type-2 Framing is important in that it highlights the
more subtle deficiencies in trust models, like how PUE attacks can also harm sensor
reputations as a side effect.
Fig 20 illustrates two cases of trust damage when the secondary network is bombarded by rogue signals: Type-1 Framing when the minority of sensors are within the
attack coverage, and Type-2 Framing when the minority of sensors are outside the
attack coverage. Assuming the network’s trust is in a healthy state, the sensors that
disagree with the global spectrum decision will be presumed malicious. In Type-2
Framing, the sensors outside the attack coverage will experience trust penalties.
To show the two types of framing, I tested for the number of misled (attacked)
sensors and PUE success rate with respect to antenna beamwidth to identify whether
trust damage occurs during a PUE attack, or at least from a rogue signal with a wide
attack coverage. I followed the same system parameters from Table 1. The rogue
signals are launched for a duration of 100 quiet periods with a transmission power of
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Figure 21: Type-2 framing diagram and corresponding simulation
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Figure 22: Type-1 framing diagram and corresponding simulation
10 mW for each integral beamwidth, from 20◦ to 70◦ . The recorded trust damage is
based on Eq. 6 with a fixed quiet period q = 100.
Figures 21 and 22 depicts the simulation results of Type-1 and Type-2 Framing,
respectively, on protocols FA , FB and FC which shows the trust damage TΣ [100] (on the
100th quite period) and the PUE success rate (%) with respect to antenna beamwidth
θ◦ . Trust damage is evident in all three protocols during successful PUE attacks, i.e.
when the PUE success rate is above 0. In cross examining these results, a negative
correlation can be observed between the trust damage and the PUE success rate,
especially upward of the 60◦ beamwidth mark. Hence, I use these results to reinforce
the notion of Type-2 Framing as a result of rogue signals from Figure 20.
Table 6 shows the corresponding false alarms (sensors misled by rogue signals) for
the beamwidth used on the four attacking directional antennas from Figure 23. The
number of false alarms increases sporadically as the beamwidth increases because of
the random placement of sensors.
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Figure 23: Trust damage over 100 quiet periods with respect to beamwidth and the
corresponding PUE success rate for protocols FA , FB and FC .
Table 6: Number of False Alarms for each corresponding beamwidth (degrees) from
Fig. 23
Beamwidth
False Alarms

20◦
56

25◦
74

30◦ 35◦ 40◦ 45◦ 50◦ 55◦ 60◦
100 123 143 170 190 209 229

65◦ 70◦
249 283

From observing the results in Figure 23 and Table 6 as well as knowing the mechanics of the trust model algorithms, a pattern can be seen between the relationship
of trust damage and false alarms. In the polar cases of 0 or Ns false alarms (where
Ns is the number of sensors), the trust damage is virtually 0, since the FC cannot find
any disagreements among the sensor reports.
RSF

PUE

0

TDΩ

0

0

FAΩ

Ns

Trust Damage
False Alarms

Figure 24: Modeling the Trust Damage from Figure 23
If the trust damage decreases to 0 as the number of false alarms approaches the polar
ends (0 or Ns ), then it can be surmised that somewhere near the middle should hold
the maximum trust damage T DΩ for a given trust model. In other words, having false
alarms equal to roughly N/2 produces the maximum trust damage T DΩ , because that
is when the sensor network is most divided in local spectrum decisions. I will denote
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F AΩ as the number of false alarms that produces T DΩ , as depicted in Figure 24.
The RSF and PUE labels over Figure 24 reflect the likely outcome of an attack
from rogue signals. As the false alarms approach Ns due to rogue signals, a successful
PUE attack is more likely to occur than the RSF attack. This can be observed in the
PUE Success Rate in Figure 23 as the directional antennas’ beamwidth broadens and
the number of false alarms increases. It is important to note that regardless of the
attack (RSF or PUE), trust damage occurs unless the number of false alarms is either
0 or Ns .
As seen in Table 7, the trust-based CSS protocol FA can lose over 50% of its sensor
trust (essentially removing over half its sensors) because it randomly samples sensors
to make decisions, and only the sensors in the current sample are penalized if deemed
inaccurate by the FC. Otherwise, protocols FB and FC have the same F AΩ as a result
of examining the reports of all sensors instead of sampling. The T DΩ differs between
all three protocols considering that they each use different trust-update calculations.
Table 7: Trust Model Comparison
Trust Model F AΩ
FA
235
FB
201
FC
201

44

T DΩ
63%
48%
34%

5

Clustering-based RSF Defense

This chapter introduces the RSF clustering defense (RCD) module that operates in
three steps: 1) analyze the RSS diversity for any clustering behavior, 2) compute
the clustering strength in order to conlude the presence of a rogue signal, and if so
3) ignore trust penalties of sensors in the attacked clusters. The defense relies on
the fact that directional antennas leave isolated radiation patterns that form dense
communities of sensors reporting H1 . Malicious sensors can perform SSDF attacks
from the software layer without the need of rogue signals and thus operates outside
the physical limitations of signal properties. In contrast, the RSF attack coverage
is bound by the rogue signal’s radiation pattern. Hence, I look towards a solution
involving cluster analysis to exploit the rogue signal’s physical characteristics, i.e., the
RF ”finger print” it leaves behind in a given region.

5.1

Network Classification and Clustering

The beginning of this section briefly examines the necessary network terms and concepts for better understanding the RCD algorithm and its motivation. I use graph
partitioning and community detection as the basis for discovering clusters of RSFattacked sensors. To partition the graph in a meaningful way, I assume that the nodes
(e.g., sensors) have discrete characteristics such as a type or class. In my system model,
the sensors are classified based on their local spectrum decision such that a given sensor si has a corresponding class ci where (ci = −1) if si reports H0 and (ci = 1) if
si reports H1 . This allows for the measuring of the network’s assortative mixing, a
term defined as the pairing of nodes with the same class [40]. However, the network of
sensors also needs meaningful edges for community detection. The RCD module pairs
any two sensors si , sj based on their class ci , cj and their mutual distance dij from each
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other in order to observe spatial clustering.
The goal of the RCD module is to find an isolated and strongly concentrated group
of sensors that report H1 . The Kronecker’s delta function δ(·) is a commonly used
piecewise constant function in assortative mixing to specify whether or not the two
nodes are of the same class [40]:

δ(ci , cj ) =




0 if ci 6= cj

(7)



1 if ci = cj
A basic mathematical formula for discretely measuring the assortative mixing in a
network can be expressed by [40]:
X
edge(ij)

δ(ci , cj ) =

1X
Aij δ(ci , cj )
2 ij

(8)

where ci , cj are the node classes and δ(ci , cj ) is the Kronecker’s delta function from
Equation 7. The left side of the Equation 8 is a summation series that iterates through
an edge list and increments for each pair of the same class. The right side of Equation 8
is the matrix formula which iterates through an adjacency matrix and increments the
same way. The one-half fraction from the matrix formula is there to remove the double
counting of pairs.
Consider Figure 25, a network with two classes of nodes such that one class is
designated by black circles and the other by red squares. In such a network, a node
can have a degree for each class. Each node ni keeps track of the number of edges
connected to nodes of the same class, denoted as degree kisame , as well as the number
of edges connected to nodes of a different class, denoted as degree kidif f . The degree
kisame can be computed by Equation 8. Similarly, the degree kidif f can be computed by
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the same equation, i.e., Equation 8, with the exception of inverting the sign for the
Kronecker’s delta function. Figure 25 displays these two types of degrees above each
node in the form of (k same , k dif f ) which can be used to measure the strength of the
assortative mixing.
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(0,3)

(0,3)
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(1,1)

(1,1)

Figure 25: Example of assortative mixing.
My solution, which involves graph partitioning and community detection, is based
on the principle of assortative mixing, but tailored in the context of cognitive radio
networks. The RCD has three requirements for operation. First, it needs the local
spectrum decision ci ∈ {H0 , H1 } for all sensors si ∈ S. Second, it needs two sets
of sensors where SH0 = {si |ci = H0 } and SH1 = {si |ci = H1 }. Lastly, it needs an
adjacency matrix A of size |S| × |S| such that

Aij =




1 if dij ≤ dθ

(9)



0 if dij > dθ
where dij is the distance between sensors si and sj and dθ is the distance threshold.
The RCD module locates k disconnected clusters of sensors Ck such that sj ∈ Ck ,
Aij = 1, and ci = cj for sensors si , sj ∈ Ck . The RCD module’s goal is to locate isolated
communities Ck that are surrounded by sensors in SH0 . To start, I measure the cluster
density of sensors with the same class by counting all connected pairs (si , sj ) such that
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si ∈ Ck , sj ∈ SH1 , and Aij = 1. This is computed on all sensors in Ck with:
1
{dH
i }k = {

X

(Aij δ(ci , cj )) − 1 | si ∈ Ck }

(10)

sj ∈Ck

where δ(ci , cj ) is a simple Kronecker’s delta function from Equation 7 that indicates
a difference in a node’s class c, i.e., the local spectrum decision. Next, I measure the
isolation of sensor si ∈ Ck from sj ∈ SH0 by counting all connected pairs (si , sj ) such
that Aij = 1. This is computed on all sensors in Ck by:
{d∆
i }k = D(Ck ) = {

X

Aij δ 0 (ci , cj ) | si ∈ Ck }

(11)

sj ∈SH0

δ 0 (ci , cj ) = D0 (Ck ) =




0, if ci = cj


1, if ci 6= cj

Finally, to measure the isolated clustering strength zk , I use the function:

zk =

∆
1
Z({dH
i }k , {di }k )

H1
i di
P H1
∆
i (di + di )

P

=

(12)

In the off chance that a number of malicious sensors from SSDF are positioned near
each other, I want to have a level of tolerance zθ and a required minimum number of
sensors per cluster Cmin . The restraint Cmin prevents a high clustering score zk from
an insignificant-sized cluster.
Figure 26 shows two scenarios: (1) the RSF-45 where each rogue antenna has a
beamwidth of 45◦ and (2) the SSDF-40 where 40% of the sensors, randomly selected,
perform SSDF. The red nodes are sensors reporting H1 , and the blue nodes are sensors
reporting H0 . The red edges are formed when ci = cj and dij < dθ for sensors si and
sj . The blue edges are formed by the same rules except that ci 6= cj .
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Figure 26: Clustering illustration of my RSF Clustering Defense (RCD) algorithm. (a)
RSF-45. (b) SSDF-40. The RCD forms two graphs, a red and blue graph, for cluster
analysis. The red graph contains edges between sensors reporting H1 . The blue graph
contains edges between sensors with opposing local spectrum decisions.
The red and blue graph both give valuable information in detecting directional
rogue signals by the cluster formations they create. The goal of the red graph is to
identify a strong concentration of sensors perceiving a radio signal within a small area.
In contrast, the blue graph demonstrates disagreements in spectrum decisions (i.e., H0
and H1 ) between neighboring sensors. As can be seen in the RSF scenario in Figure 26a,
the red graphs (created by the rogue signals) is surrounded by the blue graph without
any significant overlap. The delineation between a red and blue graph roughly outlines
a radio’s antenna coverage and becomes a clear indication of a rogue signal. However,
the SSDF scenario in Figure 26b shows that an overlapping of red and blue graphs
reveal a strong likelihood of malicious or malfunctioning sensors, instead of a rogue
signal’s presence, since there is no apparent pattern of spectrum decisions (H0 , H1 ).
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5.2

Protocol and System Flow

My work revolves around a centralized trust-based CSS protocol, which means there
is a dedicated base station that processes the cooperative spectrum sensing. This is
contrasted with local trust-based CSS protocol which requires each cognitive radio to
handle cooperative spectrum sensing on its own hardware. The benefit of having a
centralized trust-based CSS protocol is: more feasible computing power to shoulder
the burden of hosting Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), such as the one I proposed.
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Figure 27: Diagram of the trust-based CSS Protocol. Subfigure (b) adds the RCD
module after the FC step, but only when the global decision GD = H0 .
Figure 31a illustrates the general framework of a trust-based CSS protocols [12,
30, 5]. In it, f0 represents some wireless spectrum frequency, Si a set of sensors, and
Ri the corresponding set of sensor reports. The system model is a stack of dependent
layers, starting with the spectrum channel, the network of sensors, the trust model,
and finally the Fusion Center (FC). The accuracy of the CSS is dependent on the FC
receiving reliable input from the above layers. For example, the spectrum channel must
be clear enough for communication, the majority of sensors must not be malicious or
malfunctioning, and the trust model must filter the malicious sensors to protect the
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FC from bad input. The following list describes the variables in Fig 27:
• S - set of spectrum sensors (attached to cognitive radios)
• Sr - set of untrustworthy sensors flagged for removal by the trust model
• Sp - set of sensors protected by the RCD module
• H0 - the null hypothesis that presumes the primary signal is present
• H1 - the alternative hypothesis that presumes the primary signal is absent
• RCD - RSF (Rogue Signal Framing) Clustering Defense module
The RCD solution was designed to be modular, so that it could be inserted into
existing trust-based CSS protocols as a panacea against RSF attacks. Figure 31b
illustrates the order (after the fusion step) and the condition (FC reports global decision
of H0 ) for activating the RCD module. The intended goal was to prevent SUs from
being penalized by rogue signals intended to make them look malicious. However, if an
attack causes the FC to output a global decision of H1 , then that constitutes a PUE
attack and requires a different solution altogether, such as the one presented in [14].
The following steps correspond to the trust-based CSS protocol with the RCD module
from Figure 31b:
1. Collect all sensor reports from the network of sensors S
2. Apply the trust model’s filter by removing untrustworthy sensors Sr from S
3. Make a global spectrum decision, denoted as GD, from sensors in (S − Sr ) as it
normally would in trust-based CSS protocols
4. Discover signs of an RSF intrusion and identify the group of attacked sensors,
denoted as SP (for sensors protected)
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5. Update the sensor reputations except for the set of sensors SP that are presumed
affected by rogue signals

5.3

Overhead of Defense

To address the time complexity overhead of my defense, I have to examine the algorithm it uses before I can identify the order-of-growth category it belongs to. The
proposed RSF Clustering Defense (RCD) algorithm can be separated into three distinct
parts; (1) the graph setup, (2) the Breadth-First-Search to identify all the clusters (i.e.
subgraphs), and (3) calculating the clustering strength of an identified cluster. Each
part can be summarized by the following:
1. Connect all the vertices in the adjacency matrix Aij to its neighbors within a
distance threshold dθ ; this step has a time complexity of O(|V |2 ) where |V | is the
number of sensors
2. Find all non-overlapping subgraphs (i.e. clusters Ck ) using a Breadth-FirstSearch; this step has a time complexity of O(|V |2 ) since it traverses the adjacency
matrix Aij and creates adjacency lists that represent each Ck cluster
3. Calculate the clustering strength of cluster Ck based on the assortative mixing
equations (eq 9 and eq 10); this step iterates through each Ck adjacency list, thus
it has a time complexity of O(|E| + |V |)
So the time complexity of the RCD defense is the summation of all three parts:
O(|V |2 ) + O(|V |2 ) + O(|E| + |V |). Yet, in a static network, where the cognitive radios
do not move, I can ignore the complexity of part 1 since it is only computed once
during the program initialization. Hence, the time complexity for each reoccurring
quiet period is O(|V |2 ) + O(|E| + |V |). The quiet period is when the cognitive radio
network stops transmitting to listen for the primary signal.
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Figure 28: The sensor network is partitioned into a red and blue graph before being
analyzed by the RCD module. The red filled nodes are cognitive radios reporting H1
and are connected to nearby neighbors with similar observations.
The bottleneck of my defense is either in part 2 or part 3, whichever has a worse
order of growth between O(|V |2 ) and O(|E| + |V |), depending on the sizes of V and
E. The RCD algorihm travereses through K adjacency lists representing each cluster
Ck , where 0 ≤ k < K. Fig. 28 shows K = 3 clusters present (C0 , C1 , and C2 ) in the
network where each cluster is roughly 1/4 to 1/8 the size of V .
Time complexity can be an issue if an attack is able to impact the network before
the defense can adequately prevent or mitigate the damage. However, my algorithm
has a descent order of growth, i.e. O(|V |2 ) + O(|E| + |V |) ≈ O(|V |2 ), which is smaller
than many clustering algorithms such as the Kernighan-Lin algorithm that have an
order of growth of O(|V |3 ). Secondly, I assume that all intensive processing happens at
the base station, with a dedicated server and adequate computing resources performing
the analysis, and not on the cognitive radios itself. As such, the time complexity is
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very feasible for most anticipated network sizes, e.g. no more than several thousand
sensors. Furthermore, the calculation of the clustering strength is only applied to small
sections of the network, which is usually much smaller than the total number of sensors
|V |. This occurs in part 2 of my defense where Ck clusters with identical sensor reports
are identified using BFS, in similar fashion to the Flood Fill algorithm.
The need for more intensive processing, like graph algorithms, in radio networks
usually raises concerns about the impact it has on a radio’s battery life. This is not a
concern in my system, because the cognitive radios only submit sensor reports every 30
seconds to a stationary base station that does all the processing on a dedicated server.
Hence, the cognitive radios are spared the processing that would otherwise quickly
deplete itself of battery life. In a decentralized CSS protocol, each cognitive radio
is responsible for computing the shared spectrum algorithms locally, but my system
employs a centralized CSS protocol which removes the intensive processing burden on
the radio itself.

5.4

Defense Evaluation

In this section, I evaluate the RCD module’s performance on its ability to mitigate
trust loss from RSF intrusions. Additionally, I compare the RCD module’s outcome
on RSF and SSDF attacks.
In my simulations, I have two groups of scenarios, the RSF and SSDF. The simulation environment is the same as the one used by the RSF intrusion in Section 4. The
beamwidth of each rogue antenna is 15◦ , 30◦ , and 45◦ for scenarios RSF-15, RSF-30,
and RSF-45, respectively. The SSDF scenarios simulate malicious sensors by randomly
selecting a percentage of the sensors and raising their RSS by 20 dBm from the noise
floor. I randomly selected 20%, 30%, and 40% of sensors from the scenarios SSDF-20,
SSDF-30, and SSDF-40, respectively.
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Fig. 29 shows the amount of mitigated trust damage (%) with the RCD module under the same scenarios. The mitigated trust damage is denoted as TM [q] and calculated
by:
TΣR [q] − TΣ [q]
TΣ [0] − TΣ [q]

(13)
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Figure 29: Displays the network’s total mitigated trust damage (defined in Eq. 13)
from the RCD module.
where TΣR [q] is the network’s total trust on quiet period q when using the RCD
module, TΣ [q] is the network’s total trust without the RCD module (from Fig. 17),
and TΣ [0] is the initial state of trust scores. I use a minimum cluster size Cmin = 5, a
clustering threshold Zθ = 0.3, and a distance threshold dθ = 150 m.
As shown in Fig. 29, each protocol benefited from my proposed defense against
the RSF intrusion. However, the RCD module offered less protection to protocol FA
due its sequential random sampling of sensors, instead of cross-examining all sensor
reports for a more robust analysis. The spikes from FB in Fig. 29c) are due to its
protocol design of having a dynamic threshold for deciding malicious sensors. During
the spikes, FB ’s dynamic threshold is stabilizing as it replaces the old RSS statistics
with new data.
Fig. 30 shows the rate of false alarms, i.e. the number sensors reporting H1 when
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the FC reports H0 , before and after applying the RCD module. In all three RSF
scenarios, the RCD module managed to limit the false alarms to a maximum of 3% of
total sensors Ns .
Fig. 31 compares how the RCD responds to the RSF and SSDF intrusions in terms
of the number of sensors attacked SA and the number of sensors protected SP by the
RCD module. The goal is to maximize SP for the RSF scenarios and minimize it for
the SSDF scenarios so that the reputations of malicious sensors are not protected. In
scenario RSF-45, the strongest RSF attack, the RCD module protects 95% of sensors
from losing trust due to rogue signals. In contrast, the RCD module erroneously
protects 15% of the sensors in scenario SSDF-40. This margin of error is acceptable
as 40% of malicious sensors is an unrealistic and profuse amount of attacks in any CR
network. The outcomes of Fig. 31 show a high resiliency against the exploitation of
SSDF attacks.
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Figure 30: The number of false alarms before and after applying the RCD module.
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5.5

Cluster Parameters and Impact

Naturally, the size and topology of the cognitive radio network has an affect on the
RCD solution. A dense network can easily show patterns of rogue signals where as
a sparse network gives less information to analyze. To show the difference, I tested
my solution on a second network, denoted as the sparse network, consisting of 100
randomly placed sensors. In contrast, the dense network has 400 randomly placed
sensors, which is the same network tested and discussed in previous sections. For both
dense and sparse networks, I only display the RSF-45 scenario to limit the number of
graphs. The RSF-45 scenario emits four rogue signals in the cardinal directions with
45◦ beamwidth.
The distance threshold dθ is the condition required to form edges between two
sensors. A red graph indicates a strong concentration of sensors perceiving a signal,
such that it potentially reveals a rogue signal’s antenna coverage. The red graph is
formed by sensors that share H1 reports within the distance threshold, dθ . Likewise,
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the blue graph is formed by sensors that simply disagree with their neighbors’ spectrum
decisions (i.e. H0 and H1 ) within dθ . The blue graph helps reveal an SSDF attack,
especially when the red and blue graph are overlapping, and not clearly segregated.
When a rogue signal is present, the red graph should be surrounded by the blue graph,
outlining the reach of the rogue signal’s antenna coverage.
Fig. 32 and Fig. 33 show the changing composition in the red and blue graph
(created by the RCD) in both dense and sparse networks with different dθ , where
dθ = 150, 300, 450 m. For the dense network, the attack coverage of the rogue signals
is clearly visible with all three values for dθ . For the sparse network, the visibility of
rogue signals becomes much more difficult to perceive, especially when dθ = 150 m.
Naturally, this occurs from having fewer sensors, randomly placed, over the same area
as the dense network. In other words, the sensors are farther away from their neighbors
in the sparse network.
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Figure 32: RCD solution applied to a dense network of 400 sensors.
At first glance, it might be tempting to just assign an excessive number for dθ to
avoid the sparsity problem, i.e. when clusters are not clearly visible because dθ is too
low. Actually, a very large dθ can decrease the accuracy of the RCD solution as shown
in Fig. 34. An infinitely large dθ will always form complete blue and red graphs across
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Figure 33: RCD solution applied to a sparse network of 100 sensors.
the sensor region, which is not always more informative.
Fig. 34 shows the accuracy of the RCD solution for both dense and sparse networks
with dθ = 150, 300, 450 m. The accuracy is represented by the number of sensors
protected by the RCD solution divided by the number of sensors inside the rogue signal’s
attack coverage, i.e. SP /SA . Notably, the dθ = 300 m in the sparse network reaches
100% accuracy, but dθ = 450m does not, even with more edges to analyze. The reason
for this phenomena is due to the blue edges lowering the clustering score Zk for cluster
Ck . This can seen in eq. 12, where the clustering score Zk decreases because the
denominator increases as more blue edges form (from variable d∆
i ).
There are many variables in the simulations that are worth analyzing at a more
comprehensive level. The number of sensors, the number of attackers, the shape and
size of the rogue signal, the network’s topology, and even the environment’s landscape.
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Figure 34: The accuracy of the RCD for dense and sparse networks with dθ =
150, 300, 450m.

6

Dynamic Clustering Methods

In this chapter, I evaluate the RCD modules performance on its ability to detect
rogue signals in several scenarios with different parameters, which include RSF attack
coverage and network size. Additionally, I compare the RCD modules outcome on RSF
and SSDF attacks to evaluate its robustness.

6.1

Clustering Methods

There are many variables to consider in the context of detecting rogue signals through
CSS. The number of sensors, the number of attackers, the beamwidth and transmission power of the rogue signal, the networks topology, and even the environments
landscape (that accounts for shadow fading). Thus, I look toward a solution that dynamically adjusts according to the network size and density. In short, I aimed to devise
a parameter-free algorithm that 1) was effective in all cases and 2) the solution did not
require endless tweaks for optimal results.
I discuss three clustering methods to detect rogue signals, built on top of the RCD
foundation of the previous subsection. The first method, Static Distance Threshold
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(SDT), was named as such since the distance threshold dθ (threshold that determines
if an edge exists between sensors si , sj ) is statically and arbitrarily chosen. The other
two methods, K Nearest Neighbors (KNN) and Median Distance Threshold (MDT),
have thresholds that dynamically change according to the network’s size and density
at a given location, and pertains to this paper’s contribution. The three methods are
explained as follows:
1. Static Distance Threshold (SDT)
Edges are formed between any two sensors, si and sj , if the distance between
the two is below the distance threshold dθ , which eventually culminates into a
cluster. The defining characteristic of the SDT method is the arbitrary and static
assignment of dθ . The downside was having to arbitrarily determine dθ which may
or may not be effective in a given scenario.
2. K Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
For the KNN-inspired method, the distance threshold is dynamically chosen as
dθ = dik , the distance between si and the k th closest sensor sk . In short, this
method forms up to k edges for sensor si , but only when si reports H1 , i.e, it
perceives the primary signal. The downside is that k must be arbitrarily chosen,
and it is not apparent which is the best k for a given scenario.
3. Median Distance Threshold (MDT)
As the name implies, the distance threshold dθ = mediani where mediani is the
median distance of all the distances dij between si and sj in the immediate or
adjacent grid units. Like SDT, edges are formed between any two sensors, si and
sj , if dij ≤ dθ and si reports H1 . The proposed scheme does not need to set a
subjective threshold dθ or rely on the estimation of the network’s density, which
means that the method is robust to sensor locality.
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However, in all three methods, the clustering strength threshold zθ for cluster Ck ∈
S has to be manually set. The clustering strength zθ corresponds to the solution’s
sensitivity in locating a rogue signal; smaller zθ leads to more misdetections and a
larger zθ leads to more false alarms.

6.2

Clustering Threshold Determined by Locality

The RSF defense needs to cross examine a sensor si with all other sensors in S to see
if it met the conditions for creating an edge, e.g., if the distance dij between si and sj
was dij ≤ dθ . To improve both performance and efficiency, edges between sensors si , sj
are considered only if sensor sj is in the immediate or adjacent cell.
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Figure 35: To improve efficiency, edges between sensors si , sj are considered only if
sensor sj is in the immediate or adjacent cell
The RCD algorithm was modified to only form edges with sensors in the immediate
or adjacent grid units, with the use of hashmaps, in order to mitigate the overhead of
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forming edges between all sensors. In Figure 35, a sensor reporting H1 (primary signal
present) forms 11 edges with neighboring sensors reporting H0 (primary signal absent)
in the immediate or adjacent grid cells. In my example, the red sensor reporting H1 is
connected to 11 blue edges, which means all of its neighbors are reporting differently,
i.e., H0 . The optimization relies on a hashmap (key,value) structure where the key is
the grid cell id (e.g. row and column id) and the value is the set of sensors in that grid
cell. There is no need to check for edges after a certain distance, since the further two
sensors are apart, the weaker the RSS correlation [35]. This optimization alleviates the
computation burden of the clustering algorithm. In my example, the size of a single
grid cell is 200 × 200 in a grid of size 2000 × 2000.
Secondly, and more importantly, the clustering threshold dθ differs from one area
to another within the grid space, that allows the solution to conform to different community densities in a large space. Take, for example, a grid cell and its neighboring
cells, together denoted as G1 , that has a dθ = 200 determined by the median distance
of sensors S1 in G1 . Another grid cell and its neighbor cells, denoted as G2 , might have
a dθ = 300 instead. Thus we have n different diθ for each Gi where n is the number of
grid cells and 0 < i ≤ n. Having n different clustering thresholds is exactly gives the
solution the parameter-free property. The clustering methods MDT and KNN simply
determine the local distance thresholds diθ for each Gi .

6.3

Simulation Setup

I have two types of networks for my simulations, a dense network of size 400 sensors
and sparse network of size 100, which are located inside a 2, 000 × 2, 000 grid. I assume
the incumbent broadcasting station operates at the UHF frequency of 615 MHz. Like
Figure 12, there are four rogue directional antennas facing the cardinal directions and
positioned on the map’s center. I created three RSF attack scenarios, labeled as RSF63

15, RSF-30, and RSF-45 which corresponds to the scenario’s antenna beamwidths of
15◦ , 30◦ , and 45◦ , respectively. The SSDF scenarios simulate malicious sensors by
randomly selecting a percentage of the sensors and raising their RSS by 20 dBm from
the noise floor. I randomly selected 20%, 30%, and 40% of sensors from the scenarios
SSDF-20, SSDF-30, and SSDF-40, respectively.
Table 8: Scenario Types
LABEL
RSF-15
RSF-30
RSF-45
SSDF-10
SSDF-20
SSDF-30

ATTACK
Rogue Signal Framing
Rogue Signal Framing
Rogue Signal Framing
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification

DESCRIPTION
4 antennas, beamwidths=15◦
4 antennas, beamwidths=30◦
4 antennas, beamwidths=45◦
10% of sensor reports falsified
20% of sensor reports falsified
30% of sensor reports falsified

Table 8 displays all the attack scenarios I simulated to test my proposed RSF
defense.

6.4

Comparison of Clustering Methods

This subsection displays the test results of the three clustering-based rogue signal
detection methods (SDT, KNN, MDT) against the attack scenarios listed in Table 8.
There are two types of edges in my cluster network; red edges which are pairs
of sensors reporting H1 and blue edges which are pairs reporting differently. The
clustering strength zθ is the purity of a cluster community, so 0.33 means at least a
third are red edges. I picked a clustering strength of 0.33 because it proved to be
very robust to different network sizes, along with other values between 0.3 and 0.5.
Thresholds higher than 0.5 led to many rogue signals going unnoticed (misdetection),
and anything lower than 0.3 resulted in SSDF attacks being confused for RSF attacks
(false alarms).
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For the KNN tests, I set K=10. Table 9 lists the results of the three clusteringbased rogue signal detection methods on a dense network of size 400, while Table 10
lists the corresponding results on a sparse network of size 100. The table values are
fractions where the numerator is number of sensors protected by the RCD (denoted as
Sp ) and the denominator is the number of sensors affected by the rogue signal (denoted
as Sa ). For the RSF columns, a higher percentage means a better detection rate. For
the SSDF columns, a smaller percentage (which is better) means less false alarms from
an SSDF attack.
Table 9: Performance of the three clustering methods in a dense network of size 400,
in the form of Sp /Sa (number of sensors protected over sensors attacked)
SDT
KNN
MDT

RSF-15 RSF-30 RSF-45 SSDF-10 SSDF-20 SSDF-30
35/40
95/99
159/169
3/40
16/80
52/120
35/40
99/99
169/169
0/40
0/80
46/120
20/40
99/99
169/169
0/40
0/80
15/120

Table 10: Performance of the three clustering methods in a sparse network of size 100,
in the form of Sp /Sa (number of sensors protected over sensors attacked)
SDT
KNN
MDT

RSF-15 RSF-30 RSF-45 SSDF-10 SSDF-20 SSDF-30
2/11
9/25
24/41
0/10
5/20
7/30
5/11
20/25
41/41
0/10
0/20
5/30
7/11
22/25
40/41
0/10
0/20
0/30

The MDT and KNN methods easily outperform the SDT method in both types
of attacks (RSF and SSDF). Interestingly, the MDT and KNN are virtually tied in
performance, with KNN outperforming in some cases but not always. However, MDT
appears to have more resilience against SSDF attacks, meaning that it can better
distinguish between RSF and SSDF attacks, i.e. between rogue signals and malicious
SUs. It is worth noting that the MDT method is also preferable because the KNN
method requires an arbitrarily chosen K value, which may or may not be optimal for
the given scenario.
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6.5

RSF Defense on Trust-based CSS Protocols

I apply clustering methods SDT, KNN, and MDT to three different trust-based CSS
protocols (which I borrow from [12, 30, 5]) to analyze my solution’s ability to protect
sensor reputations. The previous subsection simply compares the accuracy of detecting
sensors affected by rogue signals, which is represented by (Sp /Sa ).
The first protocol FA , by Chen et al. [12], utilizes the sequential probability ratio
test (SPRT) and weights the probability by the sensor’s reputation to mitigate the
impact of SSDF attacks. The second protocol FB , by Kaligineedi et al. [30], utilizes a
pre-filtering average combination scheme. These filters are responsible for (1) filtering
extreme outlier sensor reports and (2) ignoring sensors with high-trust penalties. The
third protocol FC , by Arshad et al. [5], utilizes a beta reputation system model for
hard-decision CSS protocols. Like FA , the sensors are rewarded for agreeing with the
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Figure 36: Comparison of clustering techniques with protocols FA , FB , and FC on a
dense network.
Figures 36 and 37 shows the network’s reputation retention (i.e., the system’s total
trust on a scale between 0 and 1) at the end of a sustained RSF attack lasting 50
quiet periods. Besides incorporating the RSF defense into the three protocols, the
parameters are the same from the “Simulation Setup” subsection.
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Figure 37: Comparison of clustering techniques with protocols FA , FB , and FC on a
sparse network.
As expected, Figure 36 shows all clustering methods providing nearly perfect protection of sensor reputations. The experiment’s parameters, along with the SDT method,
were used in my previous work [28], and showed similar results. However, Figure 37
shows KNN and MDT methods clearly outperforming the SDT method in sparse networks. In particular, the KNN and MDT methods perform roughly 10% better in
RSF-30 scenarios and 20% better in RSF-45 scenarios. Simply put, the SDT method
is not flexible or robust enough to handle different network densities, especially when
the distance threshold is statically assigned.
I purposely picked a distance threshold dθ = 150 to show that clustering parameters
must be dynamic to account for certain variables in an attack scenario, such as the
proximity of sensors in cooperative spectrum sensing. As indicated in my test results, it
worked well for dense networks, but not in sparse networks where the average distance
between sensors was greater.

6.6

Clustering Figures - False Alarms (SSDF)

Figure 38 illustrates three clustering methods (SDT, KNN, MDT) on a dense network
of size 400 in a 2, 000 × 2, 000 grid, and a clustering threshold zθ = 0.33. For the SDT
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method, I used a distance threshold of dθ = 150m. The purpose of these figures is to
test the resilience of the RCD solution against large scale SSDF attacks. In particular,
I am testing the RCD module’s ability to distinguish between RSF and SSDF attacks.
The false alarm rate corresponds (roughly) to the number of edges in a figure, so less
edges is better in this case. The exact number of false alarms is in the SSDF-30 column
in Table 9.
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Figure 38: Demonstrates the clustering behavior of SDT, KNN, and MDT methods on
the SSDF-30 scenario applied to a dense network, or simply put, when 120 out of 400
sensors suffer an SSDF attack

As demonstrated in Figure 38, the MDT method appears to have the least amount
of false alarms, meaning that it can better distinguish between RSF and SSDF attacks,
i.e. between rogue signals and malicious SUs. It is worth noting that the MDT method
is also preferable because the KNN method requires an arbitrarily chosen K value,
which may or may not be optimal for the given scenario.
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6.7

Clustering Figures - Dense Network

This subsection presents figures to illustrate the three clustering methods (SDT, KNN,
MDT) on a dense network of size 400 in a 2, 000 × 2, 000 grid. These figures reflect
the RSF columns from Table 9. For the SDT method, I used a distance threshold of
dθ = 150m. As illustrated in Figure 12, the rogue transmitters are positioned at the
center of the map.
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Clustering Figures - Sparse Network

This subsection presents figures to illustrate the three clustering methods (SDT, KNN,
MDT) on a sparse network of size 100 in a 2, 000 × 2, 000 grid. These figures reflect
the RSF columns from Table 10. For the SDT method, I used a distance threshold of
dθ = 150m. As illustrated in Figure 12, the rogue transmitters are positioned at the
center of the map.
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Conclusion

My work demonstrates the RSF intrusion, a new threat to trust-based CSS protocols.
The attackers can transmit rogue signals onto groups of sensors to emulate SSDF and
ruin their reputation with the intent of having them removed from the shared spectrum
sensing. My findings caution the use of trust-based CSS protocols and warrants a line
of defense against rogue signals. The RSF simulations were conducted in a realistic
environment based on the 802.22 WRAN standard and illustrates the impact of the
RSF intrusions on sensor reputation scores. To mitigate the trust damage, I introduced
a new defense based on community detection via cluster analysis. The simulation experiments showed that my defense solution, the RCD module, could effectively keep
the sensor reputations intact while distinguishing rogue signals from malicious sensors.
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I discuss the challenges in detecting rogue signals in cooperative spectrum sensing, in
an effort to better mitigate the impact of RSF attacks on sensor reputations. Additionally, my rogue signal detection solution has a dynamic clustering threshold based on the
density of the network at a given location. This gives the advantage of a one-size-fits-all
solution when it comes to handling networks that are sparse, dense, and disproportionate. My work contributes to making cognitive radio networks a viable technology, in
particular, promoting research that helps shed some light on the difficulties of utilizing
fallow spectrum safely.
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APPENDIX - Rogue Signal Clustering Defense (RCD) Algorithm - the
psuedo code that locates sensors affected by rogue signals in trust-based CSS protocols.
Algorithm 1 The RSF Cluster Detection Module
Function:RCD(A, SH0 , SH1 )
1: Initialize cluster index k ← 0
2: Initialize set of protected sensors SP
3: Initialize set of visited nodes V
4: Initialize Breadth-First-Search queue Q
5: Initialize set of clusters Ck
6: Initialize list clustering strength values Zk
7: for all si ∈ SH1 do
8:
if si ∈
/ V then
9:
k ←k+1
10:
add si onto Ck , V, and Q
11:
while Q is not empty do
12:
sq ← dequeue(Q)
13:
for all sj ∈ SH1 do
14:
if sj ∈
/ V and Aqj = 1 then
15:
add sj onto Ck , V, and Q
16:
end if
17:
end for
18:
end while
1
19:
{dH
i }k ← D(Ck )
0
20:
{d∆
i }k ← D (Ck , SH0 )
H1
21:
zk ← Z({di }k , {d∆
i }k ))
22:
add zk onto Zk
23:
end if
24: end for
25: for all zk ∈ ZK do
26:
if |Ck | ≥ Cmin and zk > Zθ then
27:
SP ← SP ∪ Ck
28:
end if
29: end for
30: return SP
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